The pitfalls of failing to provide statutorily required public notice in the land use context were once again recently addressed by the Appellate Division in Concerned Citizens of Livingston v. Township of Livingston, (A-4171-15T3, decided June 11, 2018). There, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision and found that the underlying zoning amendment, upon which a development applicant relied, was invalid due to notice deficiencies.
In Concerned Citizens, the Township of Livingston sought to amend its zoning ordinance to liberalize the conditions associated with locating an assisted living facility in its R-1 residential district. Specifically, although an assisted living use was originally permitted as a conditional use in the zone, the amendment permitted such facilities to be of increased density that is, allowing for even more assisted living units on smaller parcels. In conjunction with this amendment the governing body conducted the necessary hearings and ultimately amended the zoning district.
Acting on the newly adopted zoning amendment, a developer filed an application with the municipal planning board to develop an assisted living facility consistent with the requirements of the newly amended R-1 zone. As hearings before the board commenced with respect to this assisted living project, a group of concerned citizens filed suit in the trial court seeking to overturn the adoption of the amended zoning district. Because this action was filed beyond 45-days from the Township’s publication of the newly enacted zoning ordinance, the trial court summarily dismissed the appeal as untimely. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed.
Because the increase in permitted density of assisted living facilities in the R-1 district was found to be tantamount to a “change” in the “classification” of a zoning district, the Appellate Division held that the more onerous notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.1, requiring personal written notice, were triggered. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division held that the municipality was required to provide written notice, via personal service or by regular and certified mail, to all property owners entitled to receive notice at least 10 days prior to the hearing at which time the zoning amendment was to be considered. Specifically, that meant that such personal notice was to have been provided to all property owners located within the affected district in which the classification change was proposed, and also to all property owners located within 200 feet in all directions of the proposed boundaries of the affected district. Instead, the municipal clerk merely provided notice by publication only, in conflict with the statutory requirements.
Citing to well-established authorities, the appellate court found that “strict compliance with statutory notice requirements is mandatory and jurisdictional, and non-conformity renders the governing body’s resultant action (adoption of the zoning amendment in question) a nullity.” (See Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2011); Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Land Use Administration, § 10-2.3 at 159 (2018) (citing Robert James Pacilli Homes, LLC v. Township of Woolwich, 394 N.J. Super. 319 at 333 (App. Div. 2007)). Due to this notice defect, the zoning ordinance amending the R-1 district requirements was deemed invalid.
Consequently, although the complaint of the citizens group was originally dismissed by the trial court as being filed well beyond the typical 45-day prerogative writ action appeal period, as prescribed by Rule 4:69, the Appellate Division held that the failure to file the complaint within this time frame was excusable because of the defective notice. Moreover, since the greater public good was involved (concerning the interests of property owners located within an entire zoning district and beyond), the relaxation of the 45-day appeal period, as expressly afforded by Rule 4:69, was also held to be appropriate in this instance.
In the end, while Concerned Citizens is unpublished, it remains persuasive as it applies well-established law concerning the requirements of public notice. It also warrants careful consideration as the court’s holding further signals a championing of due process concerns over the strict construction of the 45-day appeal period where the interests of justice are implicated.