Land Use and Development

The New York City Building Code, Chapter 33, requires a developer to safeguard adjoining property during the conduct of all construction and demolition operations. Accordingly, a developer and an adjoining property owner may enter into a license agreement, whereby the adjoining property owner provides the developer with access to its property to install Code-required protections.  In return, oftentimes the developer, among other things, pays compensation to the adjoining property owner for such access.  If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the developer may seek to compel such access through the courts pursuant to Section 881 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.

While the Building Code does not explicitly provide a right to compensation, when these issues have been brought before them, New York courts have awarded compensation to adjoining property owners.  However, whether compensation is mandated and the amount of compensation is within the courts’ discretion.  Courts often consider the length of time for which access is necessary and the intrusiveness of the developer’s work on the use and enjoyment of the adjoining property by its owner and occupants.  Without clear guidance from the courts, a developer and an adjoining property owner need to give due consideration to the issue of compensation as illustrated below.

In her ruling released late last month, Manhattan Judge Arlene Bluth denied any license fee to the Condominium Board of the Fifth Avenue Tower, an adjoining property owner to the New York Public Library.  The Library will conduct a $200 million overhaul of its main Fifth Avenue branch.  In her decision, Judge Bluth specifically rejected the Condominium Board’s request for a $15,000 / month license fee.  It has been separately reported that the Condominium Board rejected the Library’s offer of a $3,500 / month license fee.  It appears that Judge Bluth may have denied any license fee to the Condominium Board based, at least in part, on the excessiveness of its demands.

In view of the lack of clear guidelines, developers and adjoining property owners should consult with their legal counsel and should be sure not to overplay their hands when negotiating license fees.

Parties objecting to development projects have traditionally been immunized from liability for common law torts, such as malicious prosecution, abuse of process and tortious interference.  This immunity, grounded in the well-recognized Noerr-Pennington doctrine, affords immunity to those who petition the government for redress.  (See  Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S.  127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (holding that parties seeking relief from the government are generally afforded immunity unless such actions are objectively baseless).

While the immunity afforded objectors has been a difficult one to breach, recent decisions suggest that actions brought against these objectors require careful review of the facts and underlying circumstances before they can be summarily dismissed.  In order to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity, a litigant must satisfy a two-prong test:  First, proof must be established that the actions of the objector were “objectively baseless,” meaning no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits of its claims.  Second, proofs must also establish that the conduct in question was brought with the specific intent to further wrongful conduct through the use of the governmental process – as opposed to the outcome of that process.  Importantly, the second prong is only considered if the challenged litigation is first found to be objectively meritless.

Recently, however, meeting the first prong has been made easier by our court’s consideration of an objector’s track record and the presence of other repeated failed filings.  (See Main Street at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc. 451 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2017).  In Main Street, the court relied upon a Third Circuit decision in holding that the trial court failed to properly consider the defendant’s alleged pattern of sham litigation.  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc. 806 F.3d 162, 180 (3rd Cir. 2015), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 2451 (2016).  By demonstrating that an objector has engaged in a series of unsuccessful administrative and/or court challenges, developers can establish that this activity represents a pattern of utilizing the process to serve the anticompetitive purpose of injuring market rivals.  Under such circumstances, a court could very well conclude that the claims of such objectors were not brought to redress any actual grievances, but rather to promote delay and cause injury.  Accordingly, this broad immunity can be lost where the conduct at issue is merely intended to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.

As a consequence, before filing any action seeking government redress, a putative objector, much like any other litigant, should carefully evaluate the bases for its objections with a legal professional to ensure that they are both grounded in fact as well as supported by sound legal underpinnings.  To do otherwise is to invite abuse of process type claims that now have a much greater likelihood of success.  Reviewing any possible strategy that involves objecting to a rival’s application for development is now, more than ever, a critically important step to insulating the objector from exposure to counter-suits that were previously viewed as questionable nuisance type actions.

In a decision that bodes well for developers, the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld the enforceability of a long-term settlement agreement between certain Jersey City property developers (the “Developers”) and the City Council of Jersey City (the “City”).  The Agreement stems from a 2010 dispute in which the City “downgraded” the zoning of certain property owned by the Developers in Journal Square (the “Properties”), which restricted their ability to construct a high-rise condominium near the PATH station.  In Robinhood Plaza, Inc. v. City Council of City of Jersey City, Docket No. A-1070-15T2, 2017, WL 2535913, at *1 (App. Div. June 9, 2017), the Developers filed a complaint claiming that this “downgrade of zoning” violated the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), a statute intended to streamline and promote the development process.

The parties ultimately entered into a settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby the Developers agreed to dedicate certain land to the City for public use, in exchange for the City’s adoption of an ordinance allowing the Developers to construct and maintain a high-rise condominium for a period of 50 years.  The City subsequently claimed that the Agreement was null and void because it created an undue restraint on the ability of the City to perform legislative functions in the future.  Both the trial court and the Appellate Division ultimately concluded that the Agreement was fully enforceable.  According to the Appellate Division, the purpose of the LRHL is to promote the development of long-term projects and the Court concluded that the City had the authority to enter into the Agreement and was bound by its terms.

While the decision is not precedential, it certainly demonstrates that our Courts are inclined to enforce governmental redevelopment agreements even when they span lengthy periods and will have the effect of binding subsequent governing bodies.

In a recent tax court case, Holy Trinity Baptist Church v. City of Trenton (Docket No. 015909-2014, February 2, 2017), the court overturned the findings of the County Board of Taxation and upheld the tax exemption for religious/charitable use of properties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.3.  This statute exempts properties from taxation where “buildings [are] actually used in the work of associations and corporations organized exclusively for religious purposes, including religious worship, or charitable purposes.”  The Holy Trinity decision comes at a time when municipalities are aggressively challenging tax exemptions and was preceded by two other significant tax court cases discussed below.

Commencing with the tax court’s decision in AHS Hospital Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456 (Tax 2015), involving the Morristown Memorial Hospital, it appears that elevated scrutiny by municipalities is calling the exempt status of many non-profit organizations into question.  In Morristown Memorial, the tax court found that the hospital’s entanglement with for-profit activities undermined the hospital’s ability to satisfy the well-recognized three prong exemption test.  This test requires an organization to establish that:  1) The organization is a New Jersey non-profit entity; 2) The non-profit entity is acting consistent with its charter in the performance of religious/charitable functions; and 3) The activities performed on the property are not conducted for profit.  Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township, 95 N.J. 503 (1984).  In reaching its conclusion the court in Morristown Memorial focused on the hospital’s failure to satisfy the third prong of the test.  In part, the court concluded that the activities conducted and services provided by the many private, for-profit physicians, dictated a finding that a significant portion of the hospital facilities were in fact being used for profit.  The court there also concluded that it was unable to distinguish and segregate those portions of the hospital facilities where the involvement of for-profit activities did not apply.  Consequently, other than in the most distinct and limited areas (e.g., the hospital parking garage, auditorium and in-house fitness center), the hospital facilities were deemed to be taxable.

More recently, the tax court was asked to focus on the exemption afforded non-profit universities.  In Fields v. Trustees of Princeton University, a group of third-party taxpayers challenged the exemption afforded Princeton University.  Although that matter was resolved without a trial, it appears the settlement may have been precipitated by the University’s concern with what has been widely perceived to be an increasingly unfriendly environment for the exempt treatment of non-profits in the aftermath of the Morristown Memorial decision.  The settlement, which only temporarily resolves the ultimate exemption question, requires the University to pay over $18 million dollars in payments to third-parties and contributions to the municipality (in the form of payments in lieu of taxes) through the year 2022 when the University’s settlement obligations expire.

With this recent history and the presence of numerous pending cases specifically attacking the exemptions afforded non-profit hospitals throughout the state, the tax court’s decision in Holy Trinity may offer non-profits, at least religious organizations, some solace from what appears to be a concerted effort on the part of municipalities to challenge the efficacy of real property tax exemptions in all areas.  Importantly, the Holy Trinity court concluded that despite evidence indicating that religious activities on the subject church property had diminished (as the church purchased a new property for its operations and had already commenced the process of shifting its activities to this new location), the church continued to make actual use of the property in furtherance of its religious purposes.  In particular, the Holy Trinity court found that the church continued its schedule of weekly meetings, made the space in question available for future meetings and gatherings, conducted receptions, and stored books at the location in connection with its religious/charitable functions.  As a result, the continued application of the tax exemption was determined to be appropriate in Holy Trinity.

The Holy Trinity court also made clear that neither an intent to sell the property nor diminished use of otherwise exempt property in of itself will destroy the tax exemption.  The court’s decision is consistent with City of Hackensack v. Bergen County, where the listing of the property for sale and removal of certain items to increase the marketability of the property were found to be insufficient to undermine the exemption.  Id. 405 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 2009).  Further, the Holy Trinity court acknowledged that a property remains exempt even where a property’s use is limited to the occasional storage of goods used in furtherance of religious and charitable purposes.  Borough of Hamburg v. Trustee of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J. Tax 311, 319-320 (Tax 2015).

Consequently, in the current ratable hungry environment, non-profit organizations must now be more vigilant in ensuring that their properties continue to be used for the organization’s exempt or charitable purposes.  Only by regularly reviewing the entity’s activities and documenting continued property usage for its non-profit purposes, can these organizations improve the prospect of preserving the significant benefits that flow from application of this statutory exemption.

On September 6, 2008, in response to unprecedented economic and financial crisis and as an attempt to protect development permits that were scheduled to expire, then New Jersey Governor John Corzine signed P.L. 2008, c. 78 (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-136.1 et seq.), legislation known as the Permit Extension Act of 2008 (the “Permit Extension Act”). The Permit Extension Act extended the terms of certain governmental development permits and approvals to July 1, 2010, with up to a six-month phase-in period until January 1, 2011. Governor Corzine, as one of his last acts as Governor, signed legislation (Chapter 336, Assembly No. 4347) extending the end of the tolling period under the Permit Extension Act from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.

The primary goal of the Permit Extension Act is to promote development once the economy has strengthened and prevent the abandonment of approved projects and activities. The Permit Extension Act tolls the running of governmental development permits and approvals obtained during the period from January 1, 2007 through July 1, 2010, with up to a six-month phase-in period until January 1, 2011, thus amounting to a maximum four-year permit extension period.

The Permit Extension Act is a compromise between developers and community activists, including environmentalists. As such, it excludes the following categories from eligibility for extension:

  1. Permits and approvals issued by the US government or any permit or approval with a duration or fixed expiration date determined by a federal law or regulation;
  2. Approvals in “environmentally sensitive areas”;
  3. Permits or approvals issued pursuant to the “Pinelands Protection Act” if the extension would result in a violation of federal law or any state rule or regulation requiring approval of the Secretary of the Interior;
  4. New Jersey Department of Transportation permits, other than right-of-way permits;
  5. Flood Hazard Area Control Act permits, except where work has already commenced; and
  6. Coastal centers pursuant to the “Coastal Area Facility Review Act” where (a) an application for plan endorsement was not submitted to the State Planning Commission as of March 15, 2007, and (b) was not in compliance with the Coastal Zoning Management Rules.

The Permit Extension Act does not prohibit the granting of additional permit extensions otherwise provided for under law when its tolling period expires. In addition, the Permit Extension Act does not affect any administrative consent orders issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and in effect during the extension period, nor does it extend any approval in connection with a resource recovery facility.

Should you have any questions with regard to the applicability of the Permit Extension Act to any existing project, permits, or approvals, please contact an attorney knowledgeable with New Jersey laws and the Permit Extension Act.